When the polls closed in Israel in late October 2026, the result was not merely the ouster of Benjamin Netanyahu from his seat—it was a stress test of a transatlantic alliance once seen as "unbeatable." Just one week later, in the US midterms, Donald Trump suffered his own crushing defeat. This consecutive "double failure" was no coincidence; it reveals the fragile, deeply self-interested nature of the relationship between these two right-wing leaders—they once used each other as political assets, but ultimately fell together under the weight of the same political framework.
"Support" That Came Too Late: Rescue Driven by Desperation
Before the Israeli election, Netanyahu's position was already precarious. Polls showed his bloc could not secure the 61 seats needed to form a government. In this situation, he turned to his last "card": Trump. According to Axios, in the days before the election, Netanyahu repeatedly asked Trump to issue additional public statements of support, even suggesting specific wording—which the White House reportedly viewed as "a sign of desperation." Trump did comply, calling Netanyahu "a great warrior" and saying Israel "cannot afford to choose wrong," that choosing anyone else would be a mistake.
But this "strong support" did not change the outcome. Final results showed Netanyahu's bloc won only 53 seats, losing 11 from the previous election, while the opposition bloc led by Eisenkot won 48 seats and Arab parties won 19—producing parliamentary paralysis. Israel's public broadcaster described him as "already a big loser." What Trump did was merely deliver a speech before the death of a political patient—he protected his own influence but did not save his ally.
The Real "Alliance": A Deal, Not a Friendship
On the surface, Trump and Netanyahu had a "good relationship," but the essence of this relationship was always an exchange of interests. Trump needed Netanyahu as a Middle East ally to pursue maximum pressure on Iran; Netanyahu needed Trump's support for diplomatic cover on Gaza and Iran—and even to win elections. In 2026, Trump agreed to back Netanyahu because of their "shared stance against Iran"—he said explicitly that if Netanyahu were not elected, "America would have to do it (confront Iran) itself."
But this same logic backfired. In the US midterms, one of the main reasons for Trump's defeat was the unpopular war with Iran—it drove up oil prices and inflation, hurting voters' livelihoods. In other words, the "achievement" Trump helped Netanyahu with (striking Iran) ultimately became the political bomb that destroyed himself. This alliance, fundamentally about "facing the enemy together," made both sides bear the consequences in the end.
The Shared Root of Defeat: Drifting Away from Voters
Both Netanyahu and Trump suffered their defeats for a fundamentally identical reason: they ignored the voters who put them in power. In Israel, Netanyahu's loss was not merely a loss of centrist votes—it was most clearly reflected in the historic rise in Arab voter turnout, with Arab parties winning 19 seats and becoming "kingmakers" in coalition negotiations. For the Arab community, the years of Netanyahu's rule (including cooperation with far-right figures like Ben Gvir) were an oppressive experience, and that resentment translated into votes. In the US, young voters and Latino voters, who once backed Trump, were the ones who turned against him this time; the core issues they cared about—cost of living, corruption—were not effectively addressed by Trump at all.
Both leaders are known for their "dominant" and "confrontational" political style, each relying on mobilizing their base to hate "enemies" (whether domestic opponents, Iran, or the media) to sustain enthusiasm. But this approach has its limits. When people's economic livelihoods are genuinely hurt and rhetoric can no longer hide real problems, the anger they incited ultimately turns against them.
No Real "Winner"
After the Israeli election, Eisenkot, despite winning more seats, could not easily form a government—there are contradictions within his bloc between Arab parties and center-right parties, and negotiations could take months, possibly even leading to another election. In the US, although Democrats won control of both chambers, their victory came largely from voters' opposition to Trump, not from endorsement of their own agenda.